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1 Introduction
Determining the benefits of public goods is a challenging task. Benefits that accrue to private
producers should generate observable income (Eberts and McMillen 1999). Benefits that accrue
directly to households through “quality-of-life” improvements are harder to value as their eco-
nomic impacts are not directly observed. Luckily, the value of such quality-of-life benefits may
be inferred through higher housing values when households are mobile (Rudd 2000). However,
as we show in this paper, there are several shortcomings with the basic theory that directly maps
improvements in public goods to the value of housing.1 First, public goods may ease housing
production or lower local input costs, so that valuable public investments actually lower housing
values. Second, federal subsidies to housing consumption, as well as taxes on income, will distort
price responses to public goods (Albouy 2009). Third, imperfect household mobility may mitigate
or even mute price responses altogether. In this case, housing tenants, rather than housing owners,
receive some or all of the benefits of a public improvement.
Below, we analyze how public goods (or amenities more broadly) in an urban system impact
local wages, land values, the prices of housing (or other nontraded goods), and population. Our
model is more general than the standard Roback (1982) model as it accounts for nontraded pro-
duction, like housing; federal taxes, including housing subsidies; and most remarkably, population
movements with limited mobility.2 The role of these three generalizations is demonstrated ana-
lytically and in a numerical simulation below. We distinguish improvements according to how
much they affect household quality of life versus firm productivity, where, following up on Al-
bouy (2016), we distinguish between trade productivity for firms producing traded output, and
home productivity, for nontraded output. Using this more nuanced framework, we reinterpret the
estimated effects of public infrastructure on prices and wages by Haughwout (2002), finding in-
frastructure to be much more valuable. This conclusion is reinforced by new estimates of wage,
price, and also population effects, based on more data.
Our theoretical analysis and numerical simulations provide insights about how public goods
may impact competitive local labor and housing markets. The simulations predict that housing
prices capitalize the benefits of public goods quite differently than land values, making them poor
substitutes but useful complements in disentangling the channels through which public goods af-
fect welfare. Also, increases in local wages are likely to overstate increases in trade productivity
1The term capitalization is often used in this context to refer to changes to land and housing prices, not rents. In
practice, these prices are given by the present discounted value of rents. Since discounting is unaltered, rents, values,
and prices are used almost interchangeably here.
2Nontraded production is discussed in Roback, but is not developed theoretically or used empirically. Taxes 
are contained in Albouy (2009, 2016), although the analysis and simulations presented here are largely new.  The 
major modeling innovation is that the third item, imperfect mobility, which builds on how Albouy and Stuart (2015) 
translate structural population relationships using reduced-form elasticities.
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due to important wage and tax “multiplier” effects, discussed below. Local wages are predicted
to fall with quality-of-life or home-productive improvements, but not by much, especially if mo-
bility is imperfect. Tax distortions cause land values to rise with a quality-of-life improvement
much more than a trade-productive one of similar value; yet, housing prices will reflect these in
similar proportions, absent immobility. On the other hand, housing prices indeed fall with home
productivity — while land values rise — although the magnitude depends critically on household
mobility. Price decreases are greatest when mobility is modest.3
Our reevaluation of infrastructure values calls into question Haughwout’s conclusion that in-
frastructure investments are unlikely to pass a cost-benefit t est. While his original model implies 
that a typical investment returns between 30 and 60 percent of its cost (depending on the estimates), 
the general model finds that range to be 70-135 p ercent. Most of these benefits are in  quality of 
life. New estimates, based on more years, cities, and data sets, find m ore m odest ( albeit more 
robust) positive housing price effects, and larger wage effects. Furthermore, infrastructure appears 
to increase population levels. Together, the estimates imply positive net returns, with large benefits 
to firms, and some direct benefits to households, particularly if they are imperfectly mo bile. The 
new estimates also indicate that infrastructure has positive fiscal externalities and likely increases 
nontraded productivity.
2 Previous Literature and Motivation
Our valuation model generalizes the Roback model as it considers labor and technology in non-
traded production, accounts for federal fiscal externalities, and demonstrates how to use popu-
lation changes to better measure quality-of-life improvements and compensate for missing land
data. This last innovation is helpful as land values are rare and hard to measure, making it nearly
impossible to estimate how public goods raise land values (see Mills 1998; Case 2007).
The idea that land rents capitalize differences in the value of local amenities when all other
factors are mobile, has a long history (see, e.g., Ricardo 1817; George 1879; Tiebout 1956; Arnott
and Stiglitz 1979; Brueckner 1983). This idea forms the basis of valuation methods using cross-
sectional hedonic techniques (e.g., Oates 1969; Rosen 1974), as well as those using more focused 
identification strategies (e.g., Black 1999; Kline and Moretti 2014a). Since most valuations are 
conducted with home values, many previous studies may need to be re-examined to consider the
generalities raised here. This is particularly true for public goods provided across areas as large as
3Rappaport (2008a,b) considers the price effects of changes in various amenities in a quantitative model with non-
traded production, but without federal taxes, or immobility, and restricting home productivity and trade productivity to 
be equal, precluding some important issues raised here. Rappaport’s simulations are especially useful for considering 
nonlinearities for large changes, although they do not provide the same insights provided by the analytical solutions 
given here.
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a metropolitan area.4
Nontraded production has long been known to affect income comparisons. Balassa (1964) and
Samuelson (1964) first demonstrated how nontraded production complicates incomes and produc-
tivity comparisons across countries. Moving from countries to cities, our work bridges the standard
Roback model with Tolley’s (1974) theory of “wage multipliers,” which amplify how amenity val-
ues are capitalized into housing costs and wages. We also consider how public goods can improve
nontraded production. Indeed, when considering the role public infrastructure, Gruen (2010, p.
2) writes “federal and state expenditures for roads, utilities, drainage, and other improvements”
are needed to make vacant land accessible to home builders. Thus, high housing prices may be a
misleading marker of public good values when we consider housing production.
Outside of Albouy (2009, 2016), the impact of federal taxes on local prices has largely been
ignored. Moreover, those two articles do not consider how federal tax policy may magnify or
contract the effect of public goods on housing and land prices. We model and quantify these effects
below, and explain a feedback effect through what we name a “tax multiplier.” One takeaway
is that federal fiscal externalities should be counted when valuing a public good. Furthermore,
federal taxes distort local incentives to invest in public goods toward quality-of-life improvements
and against productive ones.
While perfect mobility is a powerful assumption, imperfect mobility has received growing at-
tention in estimates of the fiscal impact of local policies, e.g., Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) and
Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar (2016). Our framework is the first to incorporate imperfect mobility with
either nontraded production or federal taxes. It provides tractable analytical expressions that cover
full to zero mobility. It also interestingly divides benefits between local residents, landowners, and
the federation as a whole.5
3 Prices and Amenities in Equilibrium
3.1 Model Set-up and Notation
Consider a system of cities, indexed by j, that share a homogeneous population of households, N .
Households are identical and consume a numeraire traded good, x, and a nontraded home good, y,
with local price, pj . We discuss multiple household and home-good types in Appendices B.1 and
4Inside a metro area, effects on wages should largely dissipate, eliminating their impact on housing costs and
federal tax payments.
5Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar (2016) estimate a framework with imperfect firm mobility that subdivides gains from
local corporate income tax cuts to local residents, land values, and local firms. Their analysis based on establishment
counts impose certain restrictions on firm production, such as Cobb-Douglas production.
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B.2. 6 Firms produce traded and home goods out of land, capital, and labor. Within a city, factors
command the same price in either sector.7 Land, L, is homogeneous and immobile, and is paid
a city-specific price rj . Capital, K, is supplied elastically at the price ı¯. Households each supply
a single unit of labor, earning wage wj . Revenues from land and capital are collected nationally
and rebated as non-labor income, I +R; total income, mj ≡ I +R+ wj , varies only with wages.
Federal tax payments of τ j(y) = τ (mj − δpjy) are net of transfers, and include a deduction at
rate δ for nontraded purchases, such as housing. For simplicity, assume net tax payments average
to zero; some payments are negative, while all marginal tax rates are positive.
Cities differ in three general “urban attributes”: (i) quality of life, Qj; (ii) trade productivity,
AjX ; and (iii) home productivity, A
j
Y . These attributes depend on a vector of individual amenities,
Zj = (Zj1 , ..., Z
j
K), which may include public goods.
3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
We begin with the case where households are fully mobile, so that they receive the same utility,
u¯, in all (inhabited) cities. This equilibrium maps the three prices (rj, wj, pj) one-to-one with the
three attributes (Qj, AjX , A
j
Y ), by assuming workers are mobile and firms in both sectors make zero
profit. Households preferences are represented by the expenditure function, e(pj, u;Qj), which
increases in utility, u, and pj , and decreases in Qj . Thus, local incomes mj = wj + I + R must
provide utility u¯ after taxes: e(pj, u¯;Qj) = mj − τ j(y).
Operating in perfectly competitive markets, firms produce under constant returns to scale; city
returns to scale are embedded within the factor-neutral productivities, AjX and A
j
Y . The unit cost of
producing a traded good is cX(rj, wj, ı¯;A
j
X) = cX(r
j, wj, ı¯)/AjX where c(r, w, i) ≡ c(r, w, i; 1). A
symmetric definition holds for home-good unit costs, cY 8 Firms make zero profits in equilibrium:
cX(r
j, wj, ı¯)/AjX = 1, and cY (r
j, wj, ı¯)/AjY = p
j .
6In practice, pj is the measured cost of housing services. In an urban system, housing costs may proxy for cost-
differences in all locally-provided goods. Non-housing goods, such as haircuts and restaurant meals, are considered to
be a composite commodity of traded goods and non-housing home goods, with price pj . Appendix B.2 shows that if
housing is more land-intensive than non-housing home goods, then housing will more strongly reflect amenity values.
7Unlike in Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), where the supply of land in each sector is fixed, and cities exhibit diminish-
ing returns as the supply of residential land expands. The authors also impose Cobb-Douglas production technology
and do not account for taxes or non-labor income. See Appendix C.3 for more explanation
8Formally, e(pj , u;Qj) ≡ minx,y{x + pjy : U
(
x, y;Qj
) ≥ u}. The single index Qj assumes that amenities are
weakly separable from consumption. The model generalizes to one with heterogeneous workers that supply different
fixed amounts of labor if these workers are perfect substitutes in production, have identical homothetic preferences,
and earn equal shares of income from labor. Additionally, the mobility condition need not apply to all households,
but only a sufficiently large subset of mobile households (Gyourko and Tracy 1989). Appendix B.1 discusses the case
with multiple household types with varying preferences and skills. Unit cost is cX(rj , wj , ı¯;A
j
X) ≡ minL,N,K{rjL+
wjN+ ı¯K : AjXF (L,N,K) = 1}. Appendix B.1 demonstrates that non-neutral productivity differences have similar
impacts on relative prices across cities.
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3.3 Log-Linearization, Expenditure and Cost-Share Parameters
For analytical purposes, log-linearize the equilibrium equations around the national average, so that
for any z, zˆj = d ln zj = dzj/z¯ approximates the percent difference in city j of z, relative to the
national geometric average z¯. Table 1 summarizes the key parameters, which without superscripts,
refer to national averages: “s” is for expenditure shares, “θ′′, for cost shares in traded production,
and “φ′′ for cost shares in home production, each with appropriate subscripts. The implied shares
of land and labor used for the traded good — given by the parameters λL and λN — and the tax
and deduction rates, τ ′ and δ, prove to be key. The “chosen” parameterized values shown come
from Albouy (2009), reviewed in Appendix C.1.9 The other columns present values implied by
Haughwout (2002); Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), adjusted for absentee land and capital owners;
and Rappaport (2008a,b). The table highlights the simplifications other models often make in
regard to home production, federal taxation, and mobility, which we relax in section 5.10
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions describe how prices co-vary with city attributes in a
spatial equilibrium.11
(1− δτ ′) sypˆj − sw(1− τ ′)wˆj = Qˆj (1a)
θLrˆ
j + θN wˆ
j = AˆjX (1b)
φLrˆ
j + φN wˆ
j − pˆj = AˆjY (1c)
Each equilibrium condition states that the relative value of a city’s amenities is measured implicitly
9The one exception to this notation is Qˆj ≡ − (∂e/∂Q) (1/m¯)dQj , which is the dollar value of a change in Qj
divided by income. The shares of (gross) expenditures spent on traded goods and home goods are sjx ≡ xj/mj and
sjy ≡ pjyj/mj ; the shares of income received from land, labor, and capital income are sjR ≡ R/mj , sjw ≡ wj/mj , and
sjI ≡ I/mj . For firms, denote the cost-shares of land, labor, and capital in the traded-good sector as θjL ≡ rjLjX/Xj ,
θjN ≡ wjN jX/Xj and θjK ≡ ı¯KjX/Xj ; denote equivalent cost-shares in the home-good sector as φjL, φjN , and φjK .
Finally, denote the shares of land, labor and, capital used to produce traded goods as λjL ≡ LjX/Lj , λjN ≡ N jX/N j ,
and λjK ≡ KjX/Kj . Assume home goods are more cost-intensive in land relative to labor than traded goods, both
absolutely, φjL ≥ θjL, and relatively, φjL/φjN ≥ θjL/θjN , implying λjL ≤ λjN . Nationally, the parameters obey the
following identities: (i) sw + sI + sR = 1; (ii) θL + θK + θN = 1; (iii) φL + φK + φN = 1; (iv) sw = sxθN +
syφN ; (v) sI = sxθK + syφK ; (vi)sR = sxθL + syφL. (vii) λL = sxθL/sR, (viii) λN = sxθN/sw.
10Other applications with φL = 1, λN = φN = 0 include Shapiro (2006), who proposes θL = 0.1, θN = 0.75, and
sy/sw = 0.32, implying λL = 0.20 and λN = 1;Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004) use values implying λL = 0.5 and
λN = 1. Kline and Moretti (2014b) take θN = 0.47 and θL = 0.23. Roback (1982, p.1273) assumes sy/sw = 0.035,
but does not provide other values.
11When simply linearized with Shephard’s Lemma, the equations are
−(∂e/∂Q)dQj = y¯ · dpj − (1− τ ′) · dwj
dAjX = (LX/X) · drj + (NX/X) · dwj
p¯ · dAjY = (LY /Y ) · drj + (NY /Y ) · dwj − dpj
The first equation is log-linearized by dividing through by m¯, and the third, by dividing by p¯. As shown by Hochman
and Pines (1993), it is the marginal tax rate on wage income that matters.
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Table 1: Model Parameters and Possible Values
Nota- Chosen Haugh- Glaeser- Rappa-
Parameter tion values wout* Gottlieb* port
Non-labor income rebate rebate absent rebate
Panel A: Values parameterized directly
Home-goods share sy 0.360 0.124 0.200 0.180
Traded-good cost-share of land θL 0.025 0.055 0.100 0.018
Traded-good cost-share of labor θN 0.825 0.856 0.733 0.655
Home-good cost-share of land φL 0.233 1.0 0.300 0.350
Home-good cost-share of labor φN 0.617 0.0 0.400 0.455
Marginal tax rate on labor τ ′ 0.361 0.0 0.0 0.0
Deduction rate for home-goods δ 0.291 0.0 0.0 0.0
Immobility (see section 5) ψ 0.0/0.05/∞ 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panel B: Parameters derived from theory (see below)
Income share to labor sw 0.750 0.750* 0.667* 0.615
Share of land in traded good λL 0.17 0.28 0.57 0.19
Share of labor in traded good λN 0.70 1.0 0.88 0.87
Wage multiplier µw 1.42 1.0 1.14 1.15
Tax multiplier µτ 1.20 1.0 1.0 1.0
NOTE: Haughwout: sI is set to get sw = 0.750; Glaeser-Gottlieb: θN is set to get sw = 0.667.
by how much households or firms will pay for them. Equation (1a) measures local quality of life
from how high the discounted cost-of-living, (1− δτ ′) sypˆj , is relative to after-tax nominal income,
sw(1− τ ′)wˆj . Equation (1b) measures local trade productivity, AˆjX , from how high the labor costs,
θN wˆ
j , and land costs, θLrˆj , are in traded-good production. Equation (1c) measures local home
productivity, AˆjY , from how high the labor costs, φN wˆ
j , and land costs, φLrˆj , are in production
relative to the home-good price, pˆj .
The equilibrium conditions hold even when the attributes are endogenous, e.g., if they change
with population N j . Due to feedback effects, it can be difficult to isolate the effect of a single
public good without a full accounting of amenities. To appreciate the potential complexity of
comparative statics, say that Qj = Qj0(N
j)−γ and AjX = A
j
X0(N
j)α, where Qj0 and A
j
X0 are
exogenous, and γ ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0 are congestion and agglomeration parameters. If a city’s
transportation network improves, then both Qj0 and A
j
X0 rise. These benefits attract new workers,
raising N j . This population increase then reduces Qˆj = Qˆj0 − γNˆ j and further increases AjX =
AˆjX0 + αNˆ
j . While we cannot observe these effects separately, we may infer them if we estimate
Nˆ j , and have prior information on γ and α.
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4 Price Effects of Amenities with Home Goods and Taxes
4.1 Mathematical Inversion of Equilibrium Conditions
To describe how prices are affected by small changes in local attributes, the system in Equations
(2a), (2b), and (2c), below invert the system of Equations in (1a), (1b), and (1c). For comparison,
each price differential is multiplied by its income share, so that each equation expresses the change
in total land, labor, and home-good values relative to local income. Thus, a 1 percent increase in
sRrˆ
j represents an increase in land values of one percent of income. Each attribute is similarly
weighted. With these normalizations, we express prices in terms of urban attributes:
sRrˆ
j =
l
m
drj = µτ
{
Qˆj + [1− τ ′ (δ + (1− δ)µw)] sxAˆjX + (1− τ ′δ) syAˆjY
}
(2a)
swwˆ
j =
w
m
dwj = µτµw
{
−λLQˆj + (1− τ ′δ)
[
(1− λL)sxAˆjX − λLsyAˆjY
]}
(2b)
sypˆ
j =
y
m
dpj = µτµw
{
(λN − λL)Qˆj + (1− τ ′)
[
(1− λL)sxAˆjX − λLsyAˆjY
]}
(2c)
lj ≡ Lj/N j is the land-to-labor ratio. These expressions depend only on the fractions of land and
labor in traded-good λL and λN , and the tax and discount rates τ ′ and δ. To build understanding,
we collect some parameter into two multipliers: a wage multiplier, µw, and a tax multiplier, µτ ,
which are composed of the following parameters.
µw ≡ 1
λN
, µτ ≡ 1
1− τ ′
[
δ + (1− δ) λL
λN
] (3)
Both multipliers are weakly greater than one with normal parameterizations, λN ≥ 0, τ ′ ≥ 0.
When home-goods have no labor component (λN = 1), then µw = 1; when federal taxes are
absent (τ ′ = 0), then µτ = 1. Both multipliers decrease in λN ; the tax multiplier increases in τ ′,
δ, and λL and equals (1− τ ′)−1 if δ = 1. Subsection 4.3 explains more.
4.2 Basic Capitalization Effects
Land values are closely related to the total value of amenities, denoted Ω(Q,AX , AY ). The log-
difference of this value equals the weighted value of attribute differences: Ωˆj ≡ Qˆj + sxAˆjX +
syAˆ
j
Y = sRrˆ
j
∗, where the subscript “∗” denotes differentials with τ ′ = 0, taken from the so-
lution for land rents (2a). Thus, the last equality expresses the classical result that land val-
ues fully capitalize amenity values.12 With federal taxes, this capitalization result breaks down,
12Wihout taxes, the linearized version of (2a) is (L/N)drj = −(∂e/∂Q)dQj+(X/N)dAjX+(pY/N)dAjY = dΩj .
Per capita, (L/N)drj is the change in land value, −(∂e/∂Q)dQj is the improvement in quality-of-life per resident,
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since local land values also capitalize federal-tax payments, captured in the “tax differential”
dτ j/m ≡ τ ′swwˆj − δτ ′sypˆj .13 The land-rent differential then capitalizes this equilibrium tax
differential, i.e., it follows from sRrˆj = sRrˆj∗ + dτ
j/m. Solving for the tax differential:
dτ j
m
= τ ′µτ
[
(1− δ)
(
1− λL
λN
sxAˆ
j
X −
λL
λN
syAˆ
j
Y
)
−
(
δ + (1− δ) λL
λN
)
Qˆj
]
(4)
This expression neatly summarizes the results of Albouy (2009): federal taxes increase in trade
productivity, and fall in home productivity and quality of life; deductions mitigate tax differences
from both kinds of productivity, but magnify for them for quality-of-life.
Abstracting away from taxes, higher land values pass through to lower wages by an amount
−λLsRrˆj , seen inside the brackets of (2b) for Qˆj and AˆjX . With trade productivity, this negative
effect through land is outweighed by positive productivity effects, proportional to sxAˆ
j
X , modifying
the coefficient to 1 − λL. A similar pass-through effect applies to home-good prices: lower-
paid workers do not accept a lower real wage, unless it is due to a higher quality of life — e.g.,
sypˆ
j
∗ = swwˆ
j
∗ + Qˆ
j . This modifies the coefficient on Qˆj from −λL to (λN − λL). To better
understand this modification, we explain the wage multiplier.
4.3 Wage and Tax Multipliers
The wage multiplier, µw = 1/λN , outside the brackets in Equations (2b) and (2c), is related to
one proposed by Tolley (1974). It results from local workers purchasing home goods from other
local workers. To derive the multiplier, ignore taxes, and let equilibrium wages without home-
good price responses equal wˆ0. Since home producers make zero profits and must offer the same
wages as traded producers, they must raise prices by φN times wˆ0, meaning pˆ0 = φN wˆ0. Yet, since
workers are mobile, firms need to compensate them for the increase in cost-of-living of syφN wˆ0
by 1/sw that amount in wages, leading to a further wage increase of wˆ1 − wˆ0 = φN (sy/sw) wˆ0 =
(1− λN) wˆ0. This leads to further increases in costs-of-living and feedback effects on wages, given
by the sum wˆ∞ =
∑∞
k=0(wˆk+1 − wˆk) + wˆ0 =
∑∞
k=0 (1− λN)k wˆ0 = (1/λN)wˆ0 = µwwˆ. This
infinite sum provides a fixed point, wˆ∞ = wˆ∗, in equilibrium. The more labor is in nontraded
production, i.e., the smaller λN , the larger the wage multiplier. Operating in symmetry, home-
good prices are subject to the same effect. Land prices remain unaffected.
The tax multiplier, µw, which multiplies all of the expressions in (2), follows a similar logic.
(X/N)dAjX and and (pY/N)dA
j
Y are the per-capita decrease in tradable and non-tradable costs. The solutions in (2)
are derivable from Albouy’s (2009) model. The expressions here are more interpretable, relative to income, use factor
(not cost) shares, λ, and incorporate δ.
13Like the other terms, this differential is normalized to express how much relative to the national average house-
holds in a city pay in taxes as a fraction of their income.
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For ease, let δ = 0, and consider µτ = 1/(1− τ ′λL/λN) ≥ 1. A wage differential of wˆ∗ leads
to an additional tax payment of τ ′swwˆ∗. This payment lowers land prices for firms. They pass
on these savings to workers by the amount λLτ ′swwˆ∗/sw = λLτ ′wˆ∗. This premium is subject
to the wage multiplier, causing wages to rise further to ∆wˆ = (τ ′λL/λN)wˆ∗. This full wage
increase is then taxed, completing the tax feedback loop. Compounding these effects results in
the multiplier
∑∞
k=0 (τ
′λL/λN)
k wˆ∗ = [1/(1− τ ′λL/λN)]wˆ∗ = µτ wˆ∗. Thus the tax multiplier
magnifies any equilibrium wage differences. Furthermore, it impacts land values in addition to
home-good prices.
With a deduction, the tax multiplier also integrates how taxes lower home-good prices, which in
turn implies a lower deduction amount. Following the previous logic, wages rise by an amount sat-
isfying sw∆wˆj = (λL/λN)τ ′ (swwˆ − δsypˆj). At the same time, prices fall to offset the tax, save the
portion that is compensated for via higher wages, meaning sy∆pˆ = − (1− λL/λN) τ ′ (swwˆ∗ − δsypˆj∗).
This results in a net tax increase of τ ′ (sw∆wˆ − δsy∆pˆ) = τ ′ [δ + (1− δ)λL/λN ]. Compounding
these tax effects in an infinite sum produces the full tax multiplier. The tax multiplier causes both
wage and price differential to expand. Higher taxes beget higher wages, which beget higher taxes.
Meanwhile, higher prices beget lower taxes, which beget higher prices. Therefore, the two effects
work in tandem.
There are also three direct effects of taxes, seen inside the curly brackets. First, both pro-
ductivity terms in the price Equation (2c) are reduced immediately by τ ′. This occurs since any
initial pass-through effects of productivity on wages are immediately subject to taxes, lowering the
initial willingness-to-pay for local goods. Second, both productivity effects in the wage equation
are reduced by δτ ′. This accounts for how firms can incorporate the deduction immediately when
offering compensation for local cost-of-living. Third, there is a more complex effect on land rents.
τ ′ [δ + (1− δ)µw] sxAˆjX + τ ′δsyAˆjY . The term on home productivity reflects how price decreases
lower tax deductions. The more complex term on trade productivity is due to the initial impact of
trade productivity on wages, which is multiplied by µw, with ensuing effects on deductions given
by δ (µw − 1).14
5 Population and Price Changes with Imperfect Mobility
The model above is predicated on perfect mobility across cities, which are deemed “open.” While
the case of perfect mobility is a useful benchmark for long-run adjustments, in the short to medium
run, mobility is likely to be imperfect. Economists also often work with the other extreme of
14Roback (1982, p. 1265) reports a linear analogue to Equation (2c) without taxes in her Equation (9) expressed
in derivatives of cost and indirect utility functions. Roback states that the effect of improvements in quality-of-life on
home-good prices is ambiguous. It is unambiguous if home goods are relatively land intensive, meaning λN > λL.
This condition underpins Roback’s assumption that the determinant in her Equation 9 (∆∗) is greater than zero.
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“closed” cities, with no mobility. In a monocentric city model, Wheaton (1974) and Brueckner
(1987) demonstrate that an improvement in transportation infrastructure raises central land and
housing values in open cities. Meanwhile, in closed cities, central land values are depressed relative
to peripheral values, and infrastructure benefits are shared by workers and landowners. While our
analysis ignores the inner structure of cities, below we provide a formulation that captures some of
these features and allows for any degree of mobility across cities.15
An accepted way to handle imperfect mobility is to assume preferences for location are het-
erogeneous along an unobserved dimension (e.g., Aura and Davidoff 2008; Kline and Moretti
2014b). Suppose that quality of life for household i in metro j equals the product of a com-
mon term and a household-specific term, Qji = Q
jζji . In addition, assume that ζ
j
i comes from
a Pareto distribution with parameter 1/ψ > 0, common across metros, and distribution function
F (ζji ) = 1− (ζ/ζji )1/ψ, ζji ≥ ζ . A larger value of ψ corresponds to greater preference heterogene-
ity; ψ = 0 is the baseline value for an open city with perfect household mobility, and as ψ → ∞
the city becomes closed, with perfect immobility. ψ is therefore naturally called the immobility
parameter.
For each populated metro, there exists a marginal household, denoted by k, such that e(pj, u¯;Qjζjk) =
mj − τ(mj). Log-linearizing this condition replaces Qˆj in Equation (1a) with Qˆj − ψNˆ j , where
Nˆ j is the population change. In other words, where Qˆj0 is the quality of life inferred with perfect
mobility, Qˆj = Qˆj0 + ψNˆ
j .16 The population change depends on a complex structural relationship
depending on substitution responses in production and consumption, income effects, and output
effects in housing. We take the approach of Albouy and Stuart (2015), of modeling this struc-
tural relationship as a reduced-form relationship between population and attribute changes. To do
this, first consider the perfectly mobile case of ψ = 0. The log-linearized population change is
described as
Nˆ j0 = ε
N,Q
0 Qˆ
j + εN,AX0 Aˆ
j
X + ε
N,AY
0 Aˆ
j
Y , (5)
where εN,Q0 is the elasticity of population with respect to quality of life under full mobility; ε
N,AX
0
and εN,AY0 are defined similarly. These elasticities are functions of elasticities of substitution, as
well as expenditure and cost shares and tax rates. 17
15Both open and closed monocentric cities have perfect mobility within the city
16For some presumably large fixed constant N jmax, population density in each metro can be written N j =
N jmax Pr[ζ
j
i ≥ ζjk] = N jmax(ζ/ζjk)1/ψ . This provides the same basic structure as a discrete choice formulation, e.g.
McFadden (1978), Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), although it is not as conducive to estimation.
17Lˆj brings up the possibility of any changes in land. Therefore, think of Nˆ j− Lˆj as describing a change in density,
and for now set Lˆj = 0.The assumptions of an internally homogeneous open city, exogenous and neutral amenities,
and constant returns in the cost and expenditure functions imply that all of the production quantities increase linearly
with the quantity of land. If land in a city doubles, labor and capital will enter and also double, so that all prices and
per-capita quantities do not change.
10
For a general level of immobility ψ, we substitute for Qˆj−ψN j and solve for N j . This implies
a reduced-form relationship of
Nˆ jψ =
1
1 + ψεN,Q0
(
εN,Q0 Qˆ
j + εN,AX0 Aˆ
j
X + ε
N,AY
0 Aˆ
j
Y
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nˆj0
(6a)
= εN,Qψ Q
j + εN,AXψ Aˆ
j
X + ε
N,AY
ψ Aˆ
j
Y (6b)
Heterogeneous tastes from ψ dampen mobility — as seen in the multiplier
(
1 + ψεN,Q0
)−1
—
since firms need to pay incoming migrants an increasing schedule of after-tax real wages to have
them overcome their increasing distaste to live in city j.18
With values ψ and εN,Q0 , ε
N,AX
0 , ε
N,AY
0 all of the predictions can be reformulated. Furthermore,
the equations in (2) can then be rewritten with the substitution Qˆj−ψNˆ j for Qˆj . Besides amending
the quality-of-life change, the tax differential and land capitalization effects are now
dτ jψ
m
=
dτ j
m
+ (µτ − 1)ψNˆ j (7)
sRrˆ
j
ψ + ψNˆ
j
ψ = sRrˆ
j
∗ −
dτ jψ
m
(8)
The first expression amends the tax differential from Equation (4). It adds the term (µτ −1)ψNˆ j to
account for the tax on the real-wage premium offered to income workers. The second expression
(8) states that benefits from amenities in sRrˆj∗ net of tax effects in dτ
j
ψ/m, on the right, are shared
between capitalization effects in sRrˆj and benefits to inframarginal households in ψNˆ j . This latter
amount also depends on ψ and the actual population change we observe.19 Overall, imperfect
mobility reduces the capitalization responses in wages and prices needed to equilibrate cities in
proportion to the population change observed.
The previous capitalization formulae in (2) are modified by the following subtractions for land
18The comparative statics with imperfect mobility are indistinguishable from congestion effects: ψ and γ are inter-
changeable. The welfare implications are different as infra-marginal residents share the value of local amenities with
land-owners. The increase in real income is given by sw(1− τ)dwˆj − sydpˆj = ψNˆ j = −sRdrˆj , where “d” denotes
price changes between actual and full mobility. As with most closed-city models, the main challenge in putting into
operation the assumption of imperfect mobility is specifying the baseline level of population that deviations Nˆ j are
taken from, as a baseline of equal density may not be appropriate.
19Estimates of AˆjX and Aˆ
j
Y from wˆ
j , pˆj , and Nˆ j do not depend on ψ.
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values and home prices, and an addition for wages:
sRrˆ
j
ψ = sRrˆ
j − ψ µτ
1 + ψεN,Q0
Nˆ j0 (9a)
swwˆ
j
ψ = swwˆ
j + ψ
µτµwλL
1 + ψεN,Q0
Nˆ j0 (9b)
sypˆ
j
ψ = sppˆ
j − ψµτµw (λN − λL)
1 + ψεN,Q0
Nˆ j0 (9c)
With immobility, wages are reduced less by quality of life, are increased more by trade produc-
tivity, and are also boosted by home productivity. Home-good values capitalize quality-of-life and
home-productive amenities less, as locals benefit more from them. Most importantly, home pro-
ductivity has a greater effect in reducing local home-good prices. No matter what the value of ψ
the inferred values of AX and AY are unaffected, conditional on observing Nˆ j .20
A useful feature of the model is the limiting case of complete immobility. This occurs in the
limit with ψ → ∞. At this extreme, quality-of-life benefits are not seen in prices or popula-
tion at all; benefits are internalized completely by existing residents. Productive amenities still
affect prices, but their benefits are in proportion to the structural elasticities under perfect mobil-
ity according to the ratios, εN,AX0 /ε
N,Q
0 , and ε
N,AY
0 /ε
N,Q
0 , respectively. Curiously, the collection
20The solutions for the case of imperfect mobility come from manipulating Equation (6a) to show
Qˆj − ψNˆ j = 1
1 + ψεN,Q0
(
Qˆj − ψεN,AX0 AˆjX − ψεN,AY0 AˆjY
)
(10)
The full formulas for the capitalization effects incorporating immobility are
sRrˆ
j =µτ
{
εN,Qψ
εN,Q0
Qˆj +
[
1− τ ′ (δ + (1− δ)µw)−
ψεN,AXψ
sx
]
sxAˆ
j
X +
[
1− τ ′δ − ψε
N,AY
ψ
sy
]
syAˆ
j
Y
}
(11a)
swwˆ
j =µτµw
{
−λL
εN,Qψ
εN,Q0
Qˆj +
[
(1− τ ′δ) (1− λL) + λL
ψεN,AXψ
sx
]
sxAˆ
j
X
+λL
[
ψεN,AYψ
sy
− (1− τ ′δ) AˆjY
]}
(11b)
sypˆ
j =µτµw
{
(λN − λL)
εN,Qψ
εN,Q0
Qˆj +
[
(1− τ ′) (1− λL)− (λN − λL)
ψεN,AXψ
sx
]
sxAˆ
j
X
−
[
(1− τ ′)λL + (λN − λL)
ψεN,AYψ
sy
]
syAˆ
j
Y
}
(11c)
In the limit,as ψ → 0, the elasticity coefficients become
εN,Qψ
εN,Q0
→ 0, ψεN,AXψ →
εN,AX0
εN,Q0
, ψεN,AYψ →
εN,AY0
εN,Q0
,
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of parameters in these reduced-form elasticities describing frictionless mobility are pertinent to
understanding price responses with no mobility.
6 Simulated Impact of Public Goods on Prices and Populations
Simulating the above capitalization results using hard numbers helps to build intuition and under-
stand the magnitudes of the predictions. Our simulation applies the values in table 1, meant to
represent a typical city, to Equations (2) and (9). Table 2 reports how a $1 dollar increase in the
value of a local attribute is capitalized into local prices. To highlight the importance of federal
taxes and nontraded production, the coefficients in panel A eliminate taxes and the wage multiplier
by altering the parameterization so that τ ′ = 0 and λN = 1, while holding λL constant. Panel B
re-introduces only the wage multiplier, with a value of µw = 1/λN = 1.42. Panel C then cumula-
tively adds federal taxes on wages at a rate of τ ′ = 0.36, leading to a tax multiplier of 1.09; panel
D adds refinements for housing tax benefits and state taxes, which raises the tax multiplier to 1.17.
While the first four panels assume perfect mobility, ψ = 0, panels E and F consider the case of
partial mobility with ψ = 0.05, and perfect immobility, with ψ →∞.
The first rows of panel A and B demonstrate that, without taxes, land rents capitalize the full
value of amenities. In panel A, 83 percent of quality-of-life values are capitalized into higher
home-good prices, with the remaining 17 percent in lower wages. In panel B, the effect on wages
grows relative to prices. With trade productivity, the wage multiplier effect plays an important
role: home-good prices go from mirroring 83 percent of their value in A, and to 119 percent in
B. Naturally, these price changes are fully offset by equally valued wage increases. Even with
the wage-multiplier effect, home productivity only modestly decreases home-good prices by 23
percent of their value; this too is offset with lower wages.
Federal taxes change some of the capitalization effects substantially. While panel C covers the
case of a simple wage tax, panel D offers a more realistic case to focus on. Here we see land
rents capitalize only 63 percent of the value of trade productivity, while the federal government
expropriates the remaining 37 percent. Meanwhile, the federal government implicitly subsidizes
quality-of-life amenities at a rate of 19 percent, and home-productive amenities at a rate of 8
percent. A local government maximizing land rents has twice the incentive to provide public
goods to households than to traded-good producers.
Through the tax multiplier, wage differentials are amplified by 9 percent. In total, wages then
capitalize quality-of-life amenities by $0.27 on the dollar. This low figure undermines studies
(e.g., Moore 1998) that try to value quality-of-life amenities using nominal wages alone. For
trade productivity, wages reflect an even higher 128 percent, indicating that wage-only measures
of productivity — often seen in the agglomeration literature — can overstate differences in total
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Table 2: Simulated Effect of Attributes on Prices
Value increase from a one-
dollar attribute increase
Attribute/ Quality Trade Home
type of amenity: of life product. product.
Panel A: No Wage Multiplier; Federal Taxes Neutral
Land rents* sRrˆj 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wages swwˆj -0.17 0.83 -0.17
Home-good prices sypˆj 0.83 0.83 -0.17
Population Nˆ j 5.52 4.54 7.80
Panel B: Wage Multiplier; Federal Taxes Neutral
Land rents* sRrˆj 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wages swwˆj -0.23 1.19 -0.23
Home-good prices sypˆj 0.77 1.19 -0.23
Population Nˆ j 7.09 5.81 7.54
Panel C: parameterization with Wage Multiplier & Federal Taxes
Land rents* sRrˆj 1.09 0.53 1.09
Wages swwˆj -0.25 1.30 -0.25
Home-good prices sypˆj 0.84 0.83 -0.16
Fed. Tax Payment* dτ j/m¯ -0.09 0.47 -0.09
Population Nˆ j 8.28 3.15 8.06
Panel D: Wage Multiplier, Fed. Taxes with Housing Benefits
Land rents* sRrˆj 1.18 0.63 1.07
Wages swwˆj -0.27 1.28 -0.24
Home-good prices sypˆj 0.92 0.91 -0.17
Fed. tax payment* dτ j/m¯ -0.18 0.37 -0.07
Population Nˆ j 8.17 3.38 8.01
Panel E: Wage Mult., Taxes/Benefits, and Imperfect Mobility (ψ = 0.05)
Land rents* sRrˆj 0.84 0.48 0.73
Wages swwˆj -0.19 1.31 -0.17
Home-good prices sypˆj 0.65 0.79 -0.43
Fed. tax payment* dτ j/m¯ -0.13 0.40 -0.02
Population Nˆ j 5.80 2.40 5.69
Local resident gains* ψNˆ j 0.29 0.12 0.28
Panel F: Wage Mult., Fed. Taxes/Benefits, and No Mobility (ψ =∞)
Land rents* sRrˆj 0.00 0.13 -0.10
Wages swwˆj 0.00 1.39 0.02
Home-good prices sypˆj 0.00 0.52 -1.08
Fed. tax Payment* dτ j/m¯ 0.00 0.45 0.12
Population Nˆ j 0.00 0.00 0.00
Local resident gains* ψNˆ j 1.00 0.41 0.98
NOTE: Based on (2) with parameterization in table 1. Panel A sets λN = 1, but
keeps λL = 0.17. * indicates final incidence, with values summing to 1.00.
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factor productivity. 21
For home-good prices, taxes increase the capitalization of quality-of-life to 90 percent and
decrease that of productivity to 92 percent. Home-good prices capitalize the value of quality-
of-life and trade productivity differences more accurately than land rents considered in isolation.
Home productivity remains hard to detect with any land data.
The results for imperfect mobility are shown in panel E, with a value of ψ = 0.05, reduce
population responses by 30 percent. Benefits are now divided between land-owners, federal rev-
enues, and local residents. Land values capitalize local improvements by about 30 percent. Wages
are less affected by attributes, except for trade productivity. Home-good prices become less re-
sponsive to quality of life and trade productivity; instead, residents gain directly more from these
improvements, as their real wages rise. Home-good prices drop by 43 percent by the value of home
productivity: a much larger pass-through than before.
With perfect immobility in panel E (ψ → ∞), the results are more stark. Quality-of-life gains
have no effect on anything. Trade productivity raises wages by more than 40 percent over their
value, as mobile capital inflows boost labor productivity. These gains are taken back partly in
home-good prices from a standard “cost disease.” Nonetheless, local residents receive two-fifths
of the gains; land-owners receive less than a seventh, and the federal government receives the
most. Improvements in home productivity provide benefits mainly in the form of lower home-
good prices, reflecting them almost one-for one. Interestingly, this does have tax consequences, as
tax-benefits for housing are lower, making land-owners slightly worse off. Still, existing residents
come away with most of the benefits.
An important take away from this analysis is that when households are immobile, high housing
prices reflect not so much quality-of-life and trade productivity (employment) benefits, as much as
low productivity in housing. This insight helps to reconcile seemingly opposing views that high
housing prices reflect either desirable locations or limits in housing supply.
7 Inferring Values with Limited Data
7.1 Using Housing Costs and Wages Alone
Most of the time, researchers estimating the value of public goods do not have access to adequate
and reliable land value data. With only data on wages and home-good (or housing) prices, Qˆj
21Rappaport (2008b) finds a capitalization effect of quality of life on wages similar to the one here without taxes, as
his calibration implies similar values of λL. For other amenities his results differ as λN and τ ′ play more of a role.
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is still uniquely identified, but the two productivities, AˆjX and Aˆ
j
Y , are not.
22 The difficulty of
distinguishing trade and home productivity can be seen by combining Equations (1b) and (1c), and
eliminating rˆj , leading to
AˆjX =
θL
φL
pˆj +
(
θN − φN θL
φL
)
wˆj +
θL
φL
AˆjY . (12)
The two productivity terms are collinear: each changes wages and housing-cost in the same pro-
portion in opposite directions. Two possible shortcuts come to mind: 1) simply ignore AˆjY , as
most researchers have; or 2) assume AˆjY = Aˆ
j
X , as do a few. While convenient, these assumptions
may engender erroneous conclusions. Furthermore, they run contrary to evidence in Albouy and
Ehrlich (2016) using actual land values across U.S. cities, that productivity in the housing sector is
highly variable, i.e., not zero, and quite different from trade productivity (and, in fact, negatively
correlated with it). 23
Solving for differences in total amenity values in terms of wages and home-good prices only,
we obtain the expression:
Ωˆj =
1
1− λL
{
[1− (1− λL)δτ ′] sypˆj + [τ ′ (1− λL)− (1− λN)] swwˆj + syAˆjY
}
. (13)
This measure is increasing in home expenditures, sypˆj , and accounts for land used in the traded
sector multiplying by 1/(1 − λL), discounting for the deduction. The bracketed term associated
with wages is of ambiguous sign: high wages signal high federal-tax revenues, but also high labor
costs in housing. The measure also misses differences in home productivity by 1/(1− λL) of their
value. Even if we give up on measuring the value of home productivity, the value of the remaining
amenities is still biased by AˆjY : Ωˆ
j − syAˆjY = Qˆj + sxAˆjX − [λL/(1− λL)]syAˆjY .
22Rearranging the zero-profit condition for home-good producers (1c) demonstrates how land rents may be inferred
from housing costs, notwithstanding unobserved productivity:
rˆj =
1
φL
(
pˆj − φN wˆj
)
+
1
φL
AˆjY
This follows Muth (1969), except for the inclusion of unobserved home productivity.
23To aid intuition, consider two extreme cases. In the first case, traded goods are made without land, i.e. θL = 0.
Then, trade productivity is proportional the wage level, AˆjX = θN wˆ
j . This may be a reasonable approximation if θL
is small, but not if the variation in rˆj is much larger than wˆj . In the second case, the cost shares in both sectors are the
same, i.e. θL = φL, and θN = φN . Then,Aˆ
j
X − AˆjY = pˆj as the input costs are the same in each sector: home-good
prices may be used to infer input costs in tradables only insofar as home productivity remains constant.
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7.2 Incorporating Population Data
Without land-value data, researchers can look to other data sources to deal with nontraded pro-
duction. Fortunately, data on local population levels are as common as land values are rare. The
intuition behind using population data is that cities that are efficient in providing nontraded goods
should be able to support a larger population than cities that are not as efficient, but otherwise
equal.
Combining Equation (1a) and the analog of Equation (6b) for population yields the following
expression, which says that “excess population” (or density) not explained by quality-of-life, on
the left, must be explained by either trade or home productivity, on the right:
Nˆ j − εN,Qψ [sypˆj − sw(1− τ)wˆj + ψNˆ j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qˆj
] = εN,AXψ Aˆ
j
X + ε
N,AY
ψ Aˆ
j
Y . (14)
While immobility appears to complicate this equation, it actually simplifies to
Nˆ j − εN,Q0 [sypˆj − sw(1− τ)wˆj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qˆj0
] = εN,AX0 Aˆ
j
X + ε
N,AY
0 Aˆ
j
Y . (15)
which is independent of ψ. Equations (12) and (15) are exactly identified, so that the inferred
amenities perfectly predict population. Inverting this system, as we show in Appendix A.3, allows
AjX and A
j
Y to be inferred separately from wage, price, and population data. The total value
differential, Ωˆj , is then composed of the sum sxAˆ
j
X + syAˆ
j
Y from this calculation, plus Qˆ0
j
inferred
from prices and wages, and the immobility term ψNˆ j
The difficulty of using this procedure is that it depends on population elasticities, which are not
known as well as the simple cost, expenditure, and tax parameters listed in Table 1. These reduced-
form elasticities depend on more “structural” parameters, including these parameters, as well as
those describing immobility and substitution elasticities of substitution and immobility. However,
Albouy and Stuart (2015) do make a case for certain numerical values of these parameters appear to
explain local labor and housing supply elasticities, and in particular, population density differences
across metro area. We use these values below.24
24Long-run densities do appear to be consistent with the assumption of perfect mobility, ψ = 0, which appears
sensible. Many researchers simply assume Cobb-Douglas production, which implies large reduced-form elasticities.
For comparison we take Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009). We note four differences with our model. First, while we assume
income is rebated back to workers, they assume it accrues to absentee owners. In a general equilibrium model, this
creates some ambiguity around the share spent on nontraded goods the value of amenities to households relative to
firms. Second, they assume that traded and nontraded (housing) sector each has an “immobile capital” input, similar
to land, that cannot move between sectors within a city. This creates diminishing returns in nominal wages when the
supply of (residential) land grows. See Appendix C.3 for detail on our re-parameterization of their model.
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7.3 Inferring Benefits to Households and Firms by Different models.
We now summarize the general problem of inferring the benefits of public improvements to house-
holds and firms using parameterized simulations in Table 3
Empty cells imply that the data presented in the column are not used or are unavailable in
the methodology, and therefore do not convey information about whether there was an amenity
improvement of that type. For instance, neither land rents nor population are needed to estimate
quality of life, assuming preferences are homogeneous, since urban households are assumed to
consume land only indirectly.
If land data are available, then inference works ideally. In panel A, trade and home productivity
are inferred from cost-share weighted input costs; with home goods, these costs are considered rel-
ative to the output price. The total value of amenities involves examining land values in proportion
to its income share of 10 percent. Wages and home-good prices serve only to measure the value of
tax externalities from higher wages, minus deductions for home goods.
Without land data, the numbers in panel B show how to infer amenity values, assuming home
productivity is the same everywhere, i.e., AˆjY = 0. Housing costs help to infer trade productivity,
although the measure relies mostly on wages, with a slightly smaller coefficient than in A. The
total value of amenities now depends strongly on housing values and only weakly on wages: this
occurs from competing tax and housing cost effects almost canceling out.
Haughwout’s inference technique, shown in panel C, is similar to panel B in its limitations,
but more restrictive by equating housing with land. It is like the model of panel A in Table 2, but
using Haughwout’s values in Table 1. On quality of life, it shows a much weaker effect of prices
and stronger negative effect of wages. Trade productivity also depends more on wages, mainly as
the traded sector is a larger share of output. The total value depends only on housing prices, and
weakly, as they are being taken literally as land values. Here wages serve only to identify benefits
to households as opposed to firms.
The results in panel D present how to use population data to identify and refine estimates of
both trade productivity and home productivity, using the formula solved for in Appendix A.3.
Trade productivity uses almost no weight on housing costs, using population primarily to identify
land values. Home productivity estimates rely even more on population numbers, and negatively
on home values, much as in the ideal case. Total value figures rely strongly on the wage and
population, and essentially not at all on housing prices. The shift from relying exclusively on
housing prices to not at all, when population numbers are available, represents a dramatic shift
from the current literature. Conditioning on wages and population, housing values serve almost
exclusively to identify quality-of-life amenities from dis-amenities in home production.
Results in panel E present results from raising the immobility parameter ψ to 0.05. Since the
mobility parameters does not affect the productivity estimates, this just raises the quality-of-life
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Table 3: Inferred Amenity Values from Prices and Population
Attribute increase from a
one log point change in
Price or Land Housing Pop-
quantity: value cost Wage ulation
rˆ pˆ wˆ Nˆ
Panel A: Chosen Price Model: Ideal Data
Household QOL Qˆj 0.325 -0.499
Firm: Trade prod. sxAˆ
j
X 0.016 0.550
Firm: Home prod. syAˆ
j
Y 0.083 -0.36 0.231
Total value Ωˆj 0.100 -0.035 0.280
Panel B: Chosen Price Model: Housing Costs and Wages Only (Aj constant)
Household QOL Qˆj 0.325 -0.499
Firm: Trade prod. sxAˆ
j
X 0.069 0.506
Firm: Home prod. syAˆ
j
Y
Total value Ωˆj 0.394 0.007
Panel C: Haughwout (2002) Price Model: Housing Costs and Wages Only
Household QOL Qˆj 0.124 -0.75
Firm: Trad prod. sxAˆ
j
X 0.048 0.750
Firm: Home prod. syAˆ
j
Y
Total value Ωˆj 0.172 0.00
Panel D: Chosen Price and Population Model, Perfect Mobility (ψ = 0)
Household QOL Qˆj 0.325 -0.499
Firm: Trade prod. sxAˆ
j
X 0.005 0.558 0.022
Firm: Home prod. syAˆ
j
Y -0.333 0.274 0.115
Total value Ωˆj -0.003 0.333 0.138
Panel E: Chosen Price and Population Model, Imperfect Mobility (ψ = 0.05)
Household QOL Qˆj 0.325 -0.499 0.050
Firm: Trade prod. sxAˆ
j
X 0.005 0.558 0.022
Firm: Home prod. syAˆ
j
Y -0.333 0.274 0.115
Total value Ωˆj -0.003 0.333 0.188
NOTE: Panels A, B, D, and E use chosen values in Table 1. Panel C uses values from Haughwout column.
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and total-value estimates by ψ times the population change, Nˆ j .
8 The Value of Urban Infrastructure
Haughwout (2002) estimates the marginal benefit of public capital investments using housing-
cost and wage data from 1971 to 1992 for a sample of 36 large US cities. The public capital
stock for these cities includes roads, parks, sewer systems, and public buildings. When valued by
Haughwout and Inman’s (1996) perpetual inventory technique, this infrastructure had a depreciated
value of $428 billion in the year 2000. Financing is taken as external (i.e., state and federal).
However, if financing is internal, then the implied values would be larger.
In the next subsection, we reconsider the value of infrastructure using Haughwout’s estimates
of how this infrastructure changes wages and housing prices, based on our general model. We then
present estimates based on a similar panel covering more cities and years, using similar pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates and those with city and year indicators, or “fixed effects”
(FE). 25
8.1 Reinterpreting Haughwout’s Estimates
Haughwout follows the standard Roback model that equates housing values with land values. Thus,
he uses a housing-value differential as a land-value differential, yet he multiplies it by the average
value of urban land to estimate the effect of public infrastructure on land values. This reduction
of the zero-profit condition (1c) to pˆj = rˆj assumes that home goods are not produced — as in
Haughwout and Inman (2001) — and leaves out wage multiplier effects. It also does not account
for federal tax effects.
The original Haughwout (2002) estimates of the effect of public infrastructure on housing
costs and wages are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. The regression estimates in panel
A are based on repeated cross-sections that control for natural amenities, including climate, and
local taxes and services; the less precise estimates in panel B control for state and year effects.
The inferred values of a dollar of public infrastructure are in column 5, with columns 3 and 4
separating the values for households and firms. In panel A, public infrastructure is valued at 60
cents per dollar of cost, with 39 cents going to households and 21 cents going to firms. The values
in panel B is only 30 cents on the dollar, representing a 39-cent gain to households and a 9-cent
25While space precludes offering a full literature review, we noted that Gramlich (1994) provides. Aschauer (1989)
present income-based estimates of infrastructure which are disputed by Holtz-Eakin (1994). Fernald (1999) and Du-
ranton and Turner (2012) consider other methods to consider the growth impacts of highways in particular. See Glaeser
and Gottlieb (2008) fora larger discussion of the impact of local investments.
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Table 4: The Value of Public Infrastructure Based on the Original Haughwout Estimates
Effect of a 1 std. dev. increase Value per dollar of infrastructure
in public infrastructure on log Household Firm Total Federal
Housing cost Wages Valuation QOL tr. prod. value revenue
(1) (2) procedure (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled Estimates with Controls
Haughwout 0.39 0.21 0.60
0.23 0.003 (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
(0.02) (0.002)
Revised 1.09 0.26 1.35 -0.11
(0.18) (0.04) (0.18) (0.02)
Panel B: Panel Estimates with City and Year Fixed Effects
Haughwout 0.39 -0.09 0.30
0.12 -0.016 (0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
(0.05) (0.009)
Revised 0.70 0.00 0.70 -0.13
(0.31) (0.21) (0.29) (0.06)
Source: Estimates taken from rows 2 and 4 of Table 4 in Haughwout (2002), covering 33 cities
from 1974 to 1992. Haughwout valuation based on Panel C of Table 3; Revised from panel B.
Per-dollar values obtained by multiplying values by 14.93, the ratio of the present value of
income flows to the valued infrastructure (with a std. dev of $ 4,640 million in 1997$).
loss to firms.26
The revised estimates of the value of public infrastructure shown in each panel, use the same
regression estimates, but recalculate the values using the coefficients in panel B of Table 3, as
opposed to panel C. The revised values are considerably larger: in panel A the marginal value of a
dollar of public infrastructure is $1.35, which may passes a cost-benefit test provided the marginal
cost of public funds is sufficiently low. In panel B, the estimate is $0.70 — all to households — still
falling short of even the $1.00 benchmark, albeit it cannot be ruled out statistically. Endogeneity
concerns aside, the “Iron Law of Econometrics” (Hausman 2001) implies that estimates are likely
highly attenuated given the errors in measuring infrastructure. Furthermore, they ignore spillover
effects to suburban residents.27
8.2 Estimates from a Longer, Wider, and Deeper Panel of Cities
In the pursuit of updating Haughwout’s estimates, we construct a longer panel of infrastructure
stocks from 1974 to 2011, doubling the sample length. We increase the number of central cities in
26Our parameterization of the Haughwout (2002) model is explained in Appendix C.2.
27This effect is especially true locally, as local wages do not rise. Also note that because home productivity effects
are unobserved, it is hard to know how these bias the estimates. If public infrastructure improves home productivity,
which seems likely, then the revised estimates are too low.
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the sample from 31 to 55, and include New York City. We also expand the range of data sources
used to estimate housing-cost and wage differences to include not only the American Housing
Survey (AHS), but also the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Census (Decennial in 1980,
1990, and 2000; American Community Survey in 2005 and 2011) from Ruggles et al. (2004). One
manner in which we differ from Haughwout is that we combine benefits to renting households to
owner-occupied ones, merging the two in a “housing cost” index, described in Appendix D.
We estimate the same specifications as Haughwout, focusing on his full elasticity (log-log)
model. This specification uses total infrastructure without normalizing for population size.28 One
challenge we face is that we are unable to replicate Haughwout’s findings exactly. Furthermore,
his standard errors do not adjust for clustering effects by city. Our calculations — based on our
own data — suggest they may have been too small.29
Our wage and housing-cost estimates presented in Table 8.2 are rather different from those in
4, The wage estimates are considerably greater: 0.21 in the pooled OLS, as opposed to 0.003; 0.77
with FE, as opposed to -0.16. This may have to do with the much higher quality of wage data in the
CPS, ACS and the Census, relative to the AHS. Our housing-cost effects are slightly more modest:
0.12 vs 0.23 in the pooled OLS; 0.11 vs 0.12 with city and year effects.
Our estimates are less precise, although that appears to be due to the clustering of the standard
errors, which cluster not only by state, but also rather conservatively by year. These standard errors
are roughly double the size of un-clustered, albeit robust, ones. Still, all of the wage and housing
cost estimates are statistically different from zero at a size of 6 percent.
The value of public infrastructure to households and firms is again inferred from the coeffi-
cients in Panel B of Table 3. In the pooled OLS, the implied benefits to households are a bit
weaker; for firms they are modest, yet larger than before. With fixed effects, only the benefits to
firms are detected, but they are considerable. Furthermore, federal taxes now recoup almost half
of infrastructure’s total value. On the whole, the valuations in A and B are more modest than
the reinterpreted estimates in Table 4, yet they cannot rule out the hypothesis that infrastructure
investments generate a dollar of benefits for each dollar of cost.
8.3 Incorporating Population Changes and Home-Good Production
As mentioned earlier, estimates based on prices alone ignore information from population changes.
These may be particularly informative about home productivity changes, and if households have
28We consider alternative specifications using the transformation g = Gα, where α ∈ [0, 1] is a generalized conges-
tion parameter. We find, like Haughwout, that values of α > 0 lead to worse fits of the data most of the time.
29We did consider several variables that might serve as instruments for infrastructure investments, primarily political
ones such as those from Atlas et al. (1995) and Albouy (2013) None of our candidate variables proved to be sufficiently
relevant when trying to accommodate for stocks of infrastructure. See Cellini, Ferriera, and Rothstein (2010) for a
more successful attempt for school infrastructure.
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Table 5: The Value of Public Infrastructure Based on New Price Estimates
Effect of a 1 std. dev. increase Value per dollar of infrastructure
in public infrastructure on log Household Firm Total Federal
Housing cost Wages Valuation QOL tr. prod. value revenue
(1) (2) procedure (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled OLS Estimates with Controls
0.12 0.021 Revised 0.44 0.28 0.73 0.02
(0.03) (0.007) (0.17) (0.06) (0.19) (0.03)
Panel B: Panel Estimates with City and Year Fixed Effects
0.11 0.077 Revised -0.07 0.69 0.62 0.27
(0.06) (0.023) (0.32) (0.18) (0.33) (0.10)
Source: Housing-cost and wage estimates from years 1974 to 2011 for 55 cities combining AHS, CPS,
Census, and ACS data. Standard errors are clustered by city and year. See Appendix D for more.
some immobility, quality-of-life changes. This valuation procedures draws on panels 4 and 5 of
Table 3 Recall, this method generally infers higher productivity and overall value from wage and
population changes; conditional on population, high housing costs no longer signal total value, just
in what form it takes.30
The population numbers may be the most difficult to interpret as causal, since endogeneity
concerns are that investments may be based on predicted population patterns. Nevertheless, they
do appear to be positively related with infrastructure. The pooled OLS numbers imply a population
elasticity of 0.72; the FE, just 0.39. Both are positive and statistically and economically significant.
The results for welfare now are considerably more positive. Because of the large population
effect, the pooled OLS estimates suggest a large benefit for firm producing nontraded goods. The
net result is a $1.58 return per dollar spent, almost half through home productivity. This result
underscores the need to account for nontraded goods, and how misleading results may be if those
factors are ignored. The FE results show a somewhat smaller valuation tilted towards higher home
productivity.
With moderate immobility, the case for quality-of-life benefits also rises. With a ψ > 0, exist-
ing residents have not seen the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of infrastructure completely
offset by housing costs. The resulting valuation more comfortably passes the cost-benefit test, even
in cases where the the marginal cost of public funds is considerably above one.
While our estimates are far from conclusive, at a minimum this illustration reveals how impor-
tant valuation methods are; moreover, that they are sensitive to modeling assumptions. Even the
30When considering changes in population, it is important to note that in the early part of the sample, most central
cities saw a decline in population. In the latter part of the sample, a number of cities saw a considerable resurgence in
population, particularly cities in the “sun belt” as opposed to the “rust belt.”
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Table 6: The Value of Public Infrastructure with Price and Population Estimates
Effect of a 1 std. dev. increase Value per dollar of infrastructure
in public Infrastructure on log Mobility Household Firm Firm Total
Housing cost Wages Population assumption QOL tr. prod Home pr. value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Pooled OLS Estimates with Controls
Perfect 0.44 0.42 0.71 1.58
0.12 0.021 0.72 ψ = 0.00 (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08)
(0.03) (0.007) (0.04)
Imperfect 0.98 0.42 0.71 2.12
ψ = 0.05 (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) (0.09)
Panel B: Panel Estimates with City and Year Effects
Perfect -0.07 0.77 0.46 1.17
0.11 0.077 0.39 ψ = 0.00 (0.32) (0.19) (0.31) (0.15)
(0.06) (0.023) (0.04)
Imperfect 0.22 0.77 0.46 1.46
ψ = 0.05 (0.33) (0.19) (0.31) (0.15)
Population estimates for central cities. See 8.2 for details
best estimates of the impact of public infrastructure on prices and population, if not interpreted
properly, could lead to misleading results. For a topic as important as public investment, this has
important policy implications.31
9 Conclusion
This paper highlights how the standard urban model of wages and housing values may be inad-
equate for valuing of public goods. Valuations can be made more accurate by accounting for
nontraded production and federal taxes. In practice, these additions more than double our value of
public infrastructure based on previous estimates. Valuations may be improved further by account-
ing for population changes, particularly if mobility is imperfect. Our appraisal of infrastructure
is much greater when population changes are accounted for. Fortunately, data on wages, housing
values, and population should be available in many instances to evaluate local projects.
It is remarkable how wages, housing values, land values, and population numbers convey dif-
ferent but complementary information. Moreover, the conventional wisdom that the full value of
public goods is captured in land values, e.g., Brueckner (1983) may be misguided. Land values
do not capture federal tax externalities, nor the net benefits received by local residents when mo-
31Appendix D also considers results around commuting times, spillover effects to suburbs and other metro areas,
and the sensitivity of results to large cities
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bility is imperfect. Simulations suggest that these housing costs may serve mainly to distinguish
improvements in quality-of-life reductions in nontraded productivity. Thus, if housing prices in
a city rise while its population and incomes remain constant, this indicates that improvements in
quality of life are being negated by diminishing productivity in the housing sector.
Finally, this paper sheds light on the actual value of infrastructure. The estimates here find
that housing costs, wages, and populations all increase with infrastructure investments. While the
estimates are not conclusive, the positive results for housing do reinforce Haughwout’s original
estimates. The stronger positive wage estimates based on CPS data, combined with the novel
population estimates, evoke the older literature that focused on the contribution of infrastructure to
output. The inferred values indicate that infrastructure investments may indeed be worthwhile for
central cities, even without spillovers to the suburbs. Some of these benefits may accrue directly
by local residents because of imperfect mobility. Furthermore, infrastructure investments seem
to have substantial fiscal externalities, which help to justify federal subsidies for infrastructure.
Lastly, infrastructure services may help to keep housing costs from rising, even as it engenders
urban population growth.
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Appendix
A Additional Proofs and Details
A.1 Derivation of Tax Differential
With the definition of the tax deduction, the mobility condition (1a) becomes:
Qˆj = (1− δτ ′)sypˆj − (1− τ ′)swwˆj
= sypˆ
j − swwˆj + dτ
j
m
,
where the tax differential is given by dτ j/m = τ ′(swwˆj − δsypj). This differential can be solved
by noting
swwˆ
j = swwˆ
j
∗ +
λL
λN
dτ j
m
sypˆ
j = sypˆ
j
∗ −
(
1− λL
λN
)
dτ j
m
,
substituting these conditions into the tax differential formula, solving recursively:
dτ j
m
= τ ′swwˆj∗ − δτ ′sypˆj∗ + τ ′
[
δ + (1− δ) λL
λN
]
= τ ′
swwˆ
j
∗ − δsypˆj∗
1− τ ′ [δ + (1− δ)λL/λN ] .
The tax multiplier now includes a second mechanism: higher prices lead to greater deductions,
lowering taxes, and increasing prices further. It also softens the wage component of the multiplier,
by softening higher living costs. Thus, the tax multiplier is increasing in δ, and attains a maximum
value of 1/(1 − τ ′) when δ = 1. Substituting in wˆj∗ and pˆj∗ from (2b) and (2c) with τ ′ = 0, gives
the tax differential in Equation (4) in terms of the attributes.
A.2 State Taxes
The tax differential with state taxes is computed by including an additional component based on
wages and prices relative to the state average, as if state tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum
to households within the state. This produces the augmented formula
dτ j
m
= τ ′
(
swwˆ
j − δτ ′sypˆj
)
+ τ ′S[sw(wˆ
j − wˆS)− δSsy(pˆj − pˆS)], (A.1)
where τ ′S and δS are are marginal tax and deduction rates at the state-level, net of federal deduc-
tions, and wˆS and pˆS are the differentials for state S as a whole relative to the entire country.
30
A.3 Inferring Trade and Home Productivity with Population Data
As derived in Albouy and Stuart (2015), solving Equations (12) and (15) identifies each produc-
tivity from observable differentials Nˆ j∗ , wˆ
j , and pˆj:
AˆjX =
θL[Nˆ
j − εN,Q(sypj − sw(1− τ)wj)] + φLεN,AY [ θLφLpj + (θN − φN
θL
φL
)wj]
θLεN,AX + φLεN,AY
(A.2a)
AˆjY =
φL[Nˆ
j − εN,Q(sypj − sw(1− τ)wj)]− φLεN,AX [ θLφLpj + (θN − φN
θL
φL
)wj]
θLεN,AX + φLεN,AY
(A.2b)
High excess population and high inferred costs imply high trade productivity. Low inferred costs
and high excess population imply high home productivity, with the latter effect stronger as φL >
θL.
B Theoretical Extensions
B.1 Multiple Household Types
For simplicity, ignore federal taxes and assume there are two types of fully mobile households,
referred to as “a” and “b.” The most interesting case is when some members of each type live in
every city. The mobility conditions for each type are
ea(p, wa, u;Qa) = 0
eb(p, wb, u;Qb) = 0
I generalize the two zero-profit conditions with unit-cost functions that have factor-specific pro-
ductivity components.
cX(wa/AXa, wb/AXb, r/AXL, ı¯/AXL) = 1
cY (wa/AY a, wb/AY b, r/AY L, ı¯/AY K) = p
The terms AXa and AXb give the relative productivity of each worker type in the city. Log-
linearizing these equations:
syapˆ− swawˆa = Qˆa
sybpˆ− swbwˆb = Qˆb
θNawˆa + θNbwˆb + θLrˆ = AˆX
φNawˆa + φNbwˆb + φLrˆ = AˆY
where θ denotes the cost-shares of each factor, and θaAˆXa + θbAˆXb + θLAˆXL + θKAˆXK ≡ AˆX and
φaAˆY a + φbAˆY b + φLAˆY L + φKAˆY K ≡ AˆY . The additivity of these effects proves that differences
in productivity have the same first-order effects on prices regardless of the factor they augment
directly when weighted by the cost-share of that factor.
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Let the share of total income accruing to type a worker be µa = Nama/(Nama +Nbmb), with
the other share µb = 1− µa, and define the following income-weighted averages
sy ≡ µasya + µbsyb, sx ≡ 1− sy, ςy ≡ µasya/sy
Qˆ ≡ µaQˆa + µbQˆb, sw ≡ µaswa + µbswb, wˆ ≡ µa swa
sw
wˆa + µb
swb
sw
wˆb
λa =
sxθNa
sxθNa + syφNa
, λb =
sxθNb
sxθNb + syφNb
, λN ≡ 1
sy
[syaµaλa + sybµbλb]
Then it is possible to show that the following capitalization formulas hold.
sRrˆ = Qˆ+ sxAˆX + syAˆY
swwˆ = − λL
λN
Qˆ+
1− λL
λN
sxAˆX − λL
λN
syAˆY +
[(
λa
λN
− 1
)
µaQˆa +
(
λb
λN
− 1
)
µbQˆb
]
sypˆ =
λN − λL
λN
Qˆ+
1− λL
λN
sxAˆX − λL
λN
syAˆY +
[(
λa
λN
− 1
)
µaQˆa +
(
λb
λN
− 1
)
µbQˆb
]
Except for the terms in square brackets, ”[]”, these terms are otherwise identical to equations (2)
without taxes. The bracketed term explains that wage and housing-cost differences increase in the
quality-of-life of the labor type that is relatively more represented in the traded-good sector, or
decreasing in the quality-of-life of the labor type more represented in the home-good sector. The
wage of a-types resembles the average wage except that it is lower in places a-types prefer relative
to b-types.[
sy
sya
]
swawˆa = − λL
λN
Qˆ+
1− λL
λN
sxAˆX − λL
λN
syAˆY +
[
λb
λN
(
Qˆ− sy
sya
Qˆa
)]
The model assumes that both types of households live in each city. This assumption is easier to
maintain if the type of labor they supply are imperfect substitutes in production.
Factor-specific productivity differences do have first-order effects on quantities in the model.
For example, in the case where partial elasticities of substitution across factors within sectors are
equal, the relative employment of a-types relative to b-types is
Nˆa − Nˆb = −σX (wˆa − wˆb) + (σX − 1)
(
AˆXa − AˆXb
)
B.2 Multiple Home Goods
Suppose now that there is one type of household but two types of goods, 1 and 2, e.g., housing
versus local services. Beeson and Eberts (1989) consider this situation but do not solve for it
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completely. The four equilibrium conditions, using obvious definitions, are written
e(p1, p2, u)/Q = m
cX(w, r, ı¯)/AX = 1
cY 1(w, r, ı¯)/AY 1 = p1
cY 2(w, r, ı¯)/AY 2 = p2
Log-linearizing these equations produces
sy1pˆ1 + sy2pˆ2 − swwˆ = Qˆ
θN wˆ + θLrˆ = AˆX
φN1wˆ + φL1rˆ − pˆ1 = AˆY 1
φN2wˆ + φL2rˆ − pˆ2 = AˆY 2
If we define an aggregate shares, prices, and home productivity appropriately
sy ≡ sy1 + sy2. φL ≡ sy1
sy
φL1 +
sy2
sy
φL2
pˆ ≡ sy1
sy
pˆ1 +
sy2
sy
pˆ2, AˆY ≡ sy1
sy
AˆY 1 +
sy2
sy
AˆY 2,
then the main results generalize:
sRrˆ = Qˆ+ sxAˆX + syAˆY
swwˆ = − λL
λN
Qˆ+
1− λL
λN
sxAˆX − λL
λN
syAˆY
sypˆ =
λN − λL
λN
Qˆ+
1− λL
λN
sxAˆX − λL
λN
syAˆY
Now a question is whether using a local price index based on only one home-good price, e.g. the
one for residential housing, pˆ1, may be biased relative to using a more balanced local price index,
pˆ.32 Weighted by the relevant total expenditure share, the bias is given by
sy(pˆ1 − pˆ) = 1
λN
[λN (1− λL) (φL1/φL − 1)− λL (1− λN) (φN1/φN − 1)]
(
Qˆ+ sy2AˆY 2
)
+
1− λL
λN
[λN (φL1/φL − 1) + (1− λN) (φN1/φN − 1)] sxAˆX
+
{
1
λN
[λN (1− λL) (φL1/φL − 1)− λL (1− λN) (φN1/φN − 1)]−
[
sy − sy1
sy1
]}
sy1AˆY 1
32Without loss of generality, the capitalization into a specific home-good is determined by
sy1pˆ1 =
(
λN−λL
λN
−
[
λL2 − λN2 λLλN
])(
Qˆ+ sy2AˆY 2
)
+
(
1−λL
λN
−
[
λL2 + λN2
1−λL
λN
])
sxAˆX +(
− λLλN −
[
λL2 − λN2 λLλN
])
sy1AˆY 1
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If the cost structure of both home goods are the same, i.e., if φL1 = φL and φN1 = φN , then this
collapses to −(sy − sy1)AˆY 1, i.e., the price index is only biased up in cities relatively productive
in the first home good. When the first home good is more land intensive and less labor intensive
than the second, i.e. if φL1 > φL and φN1 < φN2 then an index based on the first home good will
more strongly capitalize differences in AˆX . In this case, the first good capitalizes differences in Qˆ,
AˆY 1, and AˆY 2 more strongly when (1/λL − 1) (φL1/φL − 1) > (1/λN − 1) (φN1/φN − 1). This
condition is expected to hold as λL is probably much smaller than λN . In the extreme case, where
the second good has the same factor proportions as the traded good, i.e., φL2 = θL and φN2 = θN ,
pˆ2 = AˆX − AˆY 2, its price only capitalizes differences in its own productivity. Most capitalization
occurs in the first good.
The distinction between home goods and traded goods is somewhat artificial, as most goods
are a mixture of both. The key distinction being how land and labor-intensive the goods are. The
broader the definition of home goods, the larger is the effective share sy, but the closer the cost
shares φL and φN are to θL and θN . The capitalization effects on land are unchanged so long as
sR remains the same. The capitalization of Q and AY will also be the same, so long as the ratio
λL/λN remains constant. The only substantial change are for AX in wages and prices: as the
definition of home goods expands, (1− λL)/λN gets larger, increasing the capitalization of AX .
C parameterization
C.1 Chosen Values
The basic parameter values are taken from Albouy (2009, 2016). Perhaps most notable is the
income share to wages of 75 percent, taken from Krueger (1999), and the share of income to land
of 10 percent. The reduced-form population elasticities are given and explained in Albouy and
Stuart (2015), which appear to explain local labor and market and housing supply elasticities, as
well as density differences across metro areas. For the immobility parameter, we consider a value
of ψ = 0.05 based loosely on values suggested by Notowidigo’s (2013) estimates.
C.2 Haughwout (2002)
To recover the proper weights, we examined the numbers from Haughwout’s Table 4 together
with some accounting in Note 9. A regression of “land price per acre” on “land price elasticity”
produces a value of an acre of land of $95,672. Similarly, the present-value of a worker’s wage is
$145,805 ($ 8,848 annually at a discount rate of 6 %).
Since the model equates land and housing, φL = 1, φK = φN = 0. This leaves three effective
parameters free, sy, θL, θK . Regressions on willingness to pay are also helpful: for firms, the
productivity equation gives 35,010×(land price per acre) + 356,350×(PV wages per worker); for
households, the quality of life equation gives 90,050*(land price per acre) - 356,350*(PV wages
per worker); in total value, 125,060*(land price per acre). From this we infer that the typical city
has 356,350 workers, 35,010 acres devoted to firms, and 90,050 acres devoted to households - a
split of 28 to 72 percent. Acreage in an average city is 125,060, or 192.3 square miles, consistent
with Haughwout’s Table 2. Thus, the total value of land is $11.96 billion. The results also imply
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there are 2.85 workers per acre, or 6.51 inhabitants per acre (Table 2). For the entire city, the
present value of the wage bill is $51.96 billion.
Thus, the acreage results imply λL = 0.280 = (1 − sy)θL/[sy + (1 − sy)θL]. λL = 0.280 =
(1− sy)θL/sR. Each value of the wage bill to land sR/sw = 0.2301. Putting these two expressions
together sR = 0.2301sw = (1 − sy)θL/(0.280) or (1 − sy)θL = 0.064428sw Finally, this leaves
the parameter sI = (1− sy)θI free. Since the chosen value for sw is 0.75, we benchmark the other
parameters to be comparable to Haughwout’s figures. Through accounting identities, this then fixes
sI . Thus, the implicit parameterization is then sy = 0.124, sR = 0.173, θL = 0.055, θN = 0.856.
Total income, Nm, is equal to the wage bill $51.96 billion divided by 0.75, or $69.28 billion.
Taking a value sw < 0.75, in the Haughwout calibration leads to a larger total income and
larger inferred values in the revised estimates. If the shares of income from land are set equal,
so that sR = 0.1 in Haughwout’s model, this produces a total income value of $119,965 million,
creating revised estimates that are an additional 72 percent higher. To be conservative, and since
land values are likely to be a larger source of income in central cities, these higher values are not
presented.
C.3 Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009)
The mapping between our model and Glaeser and Gottlieb cannot be perfect, since theirs effec-
tively assumes absentee property and owners and that land in traded and nontraded production are
separate. Nevertheless, for this parameterization, we make use of several quotes
• “Labor’s share in total output [1− α] may be two-thirds.”
• “We need a parameter estimate for 1−β, such as 0.3, the average share of household spend-
ing on housing.”
• “One estimate of the share of nontraded capital, αγ, in production might be 0.1”
• “approximately 30 percent of housing costs are associated with land and permitting across
the United States... This suggests values of 0.4 for labor costs and 0.3 for traded capital.”
We assume that the absentee owners consume only traded goods. Thus the effective home
good share is sy = (2/3)(3/10) = 1/5. For labor to receive 2/3 of income, we must then set
θN = 11/15. Then sw = (1− sy)θN + syφN = (4/5)(11/15) + (1/5)(2/5) = 2/3. The rest then
falls into place through accounting identities.33
C.4 Rappaport
The parameter values taken from Rappaport (2008a, b) are taken from his baseline calibration in
Table 3 of Rappaport (2008b). Note, that our model differs from his in that he models leisure, and
integrates quality-of-life, using CES aggregators.
33If owners are not truly “absentee,” then one option is simply to rebate the money back. Based on the cost shares,
labor receives 54 of income: s′w = (1 − s′y)θN + s′yφN = 0.7(0.733) + 0.3(0.4) = 0.54. This leaves 46 percent of
income from these workers to go to capital (30) and land (16), which must go somewhere by general equilibrium.
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D Data and Estimation
Below we discuss issues with the data. With the exception of our instrumental variables strategy,
we largely follow Haughwout’s (2002) choice of variables wherever possible, and adopt some of
his notation as well. However, by collecting data for primary central cities of 84 U.S. metropolitan
areas from 1974 to 2011, we vastly expand on the data sets previously used in the literature.
In order to construct housing price and wage differentials, we use microdata from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), Census of Population, and American Housing Survey (AHS). The city
infrastructure variable, our main independent variable, is built using the surveys of government
finances 1905-2011. While our data sets include information on the residents and their housing
within each central city at each cross section, measures of infrastructure are variable only across
cities. For each of the samples, Table D below shows the years each city is available. Table 8
provides detailed information on the variables used from each data set and Table 9 provides some
summary statistics.
We use all available data sources to get the most accurate estimates of wage and housing price
differentials in the first stage. We estimate housing price differentials for owners and renters using
AHS, and Census of Population. Wage differentials are estimated for 17- to 55-year-old heads
of households who are fully employed using all three data sets, including CPS. The variables
controlled for in the first stage are different, however, we control for data set by year interactions
in the second stage to combine our estimates.34
D.1 Infrastructure Stocks
The infrastructure measures are created using the surveys of city finances beginning in 1905, and
cover multiple types of infrastructure and accounting methods. The replacement value of pub-
lic capital in place is estimated by applying the perpetual inventory technique to get gross-of-
depreciation capital investment flows from 1905 to the present. Similar to Haughwout (2002), we
divide capital investment into three different types: 1) construction, 2) land and existing structures
(L&ES), and 3) equipment when possible.35 However, the survey of city finances does not al-
low us to distinguish among the three types of capital spending. We can identify total investment
spending, total construction, total non-construction spending, and general investment spending.
Equipment is only separately identifiable in the unit level data sets, which are currently only
available in years 1943–1950, 1987–1992, and 1995–2011. In other years, we will have construc-
tion and other capital outlays, which include equipment and land and existing structures. Given
that the rates of depreciation for the latter two categories are significantly different, we impute the
34See Table 8 for a full list of control variables for each data set.
35Construction: Production, additions, replacements, or major structural alterations to fixed works, undertaken
either on a contractual basis by private contractors or through a governments own staff. Purchase of Land and Existing
Structures: Acquisition of these assets as such by outright purchase; payments on capital lease-purchase agreements or
installment purchase contracts; costs associated with eminent domain (including purchase of rights-of-way); and tax
or special assessment foreclosure. Purchase of Equipment: Purchase and installation of apparatus, furnishings, motor
vehicles, office equipment, and the like having a life expectancy of more than five years. Other Than Construction: This
object category represents the combined definitions for “Purchase of Land and Existing Structures” plus “Purchase of
Equipment.” We construct state and local infrastructure stocks following the perpetual inventory approach as used by
Haughwout and Inman (1996) and Haughwout. Similarly, we use depreciation rate of 0.11 for equipment, 0.0182 for
construction, and 0.01638 for land and existing structures.
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equipment expenditures in other years. We use the average historical shares of equipment, and
land and existing structures to create appropriate shares.
The most thorough and accurate capital series we could construct was patched together from
several sources and are as follows. For 1987–1992 and 1995–2011, we construct the exact spending
by all American city and state governments on different types of capital in different sectors. For
1993–1994, only the total spending and construction numbers are known exactly. The L&ES and
equipment numbers were created by taking city-specific historical averages from 1987–1992 and
1995–2011 and applying those to the non-construction spending. For 1951–1986, construction and
total spending numbers are exact for all cities; non-construction spending is allocated into L&ES
and equipment in the same way that 1993 and 1994 was. The shares of the L&ES and equipment
in general expenditures are applied to total expenditure minus construction to get total L&ES and
equipment.
Finally, prior to 1951 data are available only for spending in larger cities, starting in 1905.36.
It is impossible to distinguish between construction, L&ES and equipment for 1943–1950. So the
shares of the different types of capital in capital outlays are taken and applied to total expenditure.
Finally, we interpolate the missing data points in our data set to impute the capital outlays for the
years before each city first appears in our data set.
We also construct a series of state infrastructure stocks via Census Bureau state government
investment data. When doing so, we do not double count city infrastructure spending because
individual government units complete the Census surveys, and the state government does not report
city government spending. Of course, state governments invest in cities, so the local infrastructure
stock does not actually represent an estimate of the total infrastructure stock present within a city;
the local infrastructure stock is an estimate of the infrastructure stock created by local government.
The data are available from years 1942-2011 37. Before 1950, the government investment data
are available bi-annually. We create an annual investment measure by averaging the adjacent non-
missing years.38
Figure 1 plots the four central variables — housing-cost differentials, wage-differentials, pop-
ulation, and infrastructure stocks — for our four largest central cities: New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and Houston.
D.2 Amenity Controls
We use several variables to control for city characteristics not captured by infrastucture. The rate
of violent crimes per 100,000 residents, which we call the crime rate, is taken from the Uniform
Crime Report (UCR) published by the FBI.39 For the handful of months with missing data, we use
the previous month’s value. There are a few cases where the crime rate is implausibly zero, e.g.
Oakland 1995, Cincinnati 1997 and Baltimore 1999, which we attribute to missing data.
Haughwout uses both state and city level income and sales tax rates from Significant Features of
Fiscal Federalism published by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Unfor-
36Compendium of Government Finances and Historical Statistics on State and Local Governmental (1905-1951) is
not digitized. So, we manually enter the data from PDF files.
37Data for Alaska and Hawaii are available beginning in 1959, the year in which they became states. Data for
Washington D.C. is available beginning in 1951, the year in which it was first surveyed.
38For example, if year t data are missing, we construct LGj,t = (LGj,t−1 + LGj,t+1)/2.
39We obtained the UCR series from Justin McCrarys website, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/ jmccrary/UCR/.
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Figure 1: Price, Wage, Population and Infrastructure Values for the Four Largest Central Cities
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tunately, this Commission is now defunct. We are not aware of a centralized database of city-level
income and sales taxes. As a result, we do not have city level income or sales tax rates. We have
data on the top state income tax rate, bottom state income tax rate, and state sales tax rate.40
Three variables that describe cities climate amenities are mean annual heating days, mean
annual cooling days and mean annual rainfall. We obtained these data from the National Climatic
Data Center and smoothed out effects of weather anomalies by using 10-year averages. Data for
both 1980–1989 and 1990–1999 are available.
We obtain city level student to full-time teacher equivalent ratios from the Department of Ed-
ucation Common Core of Data. There are some issues with this data. First, several years are
missing: 1981, 1979, 1977, 1976. Second, there are mistakes in some of the older files, as some
pupil-teacher rates are unreasonably high or low. To account for this, we drop the outliers and use
MA-3 smoothing and interpolation to impute these cases. Finally, for years 1973-1975, only the
number of full-time teachers and part-time teachers was published. Hence, we assume that a part-
time teacher is equivalent to 0.5 of a full-time teacher in those surveys and calculate the full-time
teacher equivalent ratio by hand.
Table 8: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for
Key Variables
Dependent variables: vary by house (i), region (j) and time (t).
Source: American Housing Survey, Decennial Census. 1974-2011
1. HV, House and land value, continuous.
Source: American Housing Survey, Decennial Census, and Consumer Population Survey, 1974-
2011
2. W, Annual wages and salaries, head of household, continuous.
HQ vector: house quality controls, vary by house (i), region (j) and time (t).
Source (a): American Housing Survey, 1974-2011
1. No. of bathrooms: polychotomous, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.51
2. No. of bedrooms: polychotomous, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61
3. Basement: dichotomous, 0-1
4. Condominium: dichotomous, 0-1
5. Central air conditioning: dichotomous, 0-1
6. Detached unit: dichotomous, 0-1
7. Garage present: dichotomous, 0-1 41
8. Age of house: continuous
9. No. of other rooms: continuous (=total rooms-bedrooms-bathrooms)
10. Public sewerage hookup: dichotomous, 0-1
11. Heating equipment: polychotomous (warm air, electric, steam, other)
12. House quality rating: polychotomous (excellent, good, fair, poor)
40We thank Nathan Seegert for providing us with this data, which he compiled from The Book of the States and
other sources, as described in Seegert (2012).
41Age of the house is computed as a function of when the house is reported to have been built. Those data are
reported in interval form. The midpoint of the interval is used as the year of construction. When bottom coding is
relevant (for old homes), the house is assumed to have been built during the bottom code year.
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Table 8: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for Key Variables
13. Central city indicator: dichotomous, 0-1
Source (b): Decennial Census and American Community Survey, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005-
2011
1. No. of rooms: polychotomous, N/A, 1, 2, ... , 9, and 10+
2. Condominium: dichotomous, 0-1
3. Number of units in structure: polychotomous, Mobile home or trailer, 2 family building, 3-4
family building, 5-9 family building, One unit- unspecified type, 10+ units in structure (CPS)
4. Heating equipment: polychotomous (warm air, electric, steam, other)
5. Commercial use: dichotomous, 0-1
6. Acreage: polychotomous, N/A, less than 1, 1-9, and 10+ acres
7. Built year: polychotomous, Before 1940, 1940-49, 1950-49, ..., 2000+
8. Complete Plumbing: dichotomous, 0-1
9. Own Kitchen: dichotomous, 0-1
10. Interaction of the above with ownership status.
HC vector: head of household human capital controls, vary by house (i), region (j), and time (t).
Source (a): American Housing Survey, 1974-2011
1. Age: continuous
2. Education: polychotomous (no school, elementary, some HS, HS graduate, some college,
College graduate, graduate school)
3. Married: dichotomous, 0-1
4. White: dichotomous, 0-1
5. Hispanic: dichotomous, 0-1
Source (b) & (c): Decennial Census and American Community Survey, 1980, 1990, 2000, and
2005-2011 & Current Population Survey, 1974-2011
1. Educational: polychotomous with 12 categories
2. A quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of education,
continuous
3. Industry at the one-digit level (1950 classification): polychotomous with 9 categories
4. Employment at the one-digit level (1950 classification): polychotomous with 12 categories
5. Marital status, polychotomous (married, divorced, widowed, separated)
6. Veteran status, dichotomous, 0-1; and veteran status interacted with age
7. Minority status, polychotomous (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other)
8. Immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status interacted
with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other. (Not in CPS)
9. English proficiency, polychotomous (none, poor, or well) (Not in CPS)
STS and LTS: local and state tax and service vectors, vary by region ( j) and year (t).
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Table 8: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for
Key Variables
Sources: Government Finances (GF) series (Census a, various years); Signicant Features of Fiscal
Federalism (ACIR, various years); US Bureau of the Census, 1974-1991; Digest of Educational
Statistics (DES), (Department of Education, various years); Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), (FBI,
various years).
1. Mean city effective property tax rate: continuous, Source: AHS
2. State income tax rate: continuous
3. State sales tax rate: continuous 42
4. Serious crimes per 100 000 population: continuous, UCR
5. Student-teacher ratio in city schools: continuous, Department of Education Common Core of
Data
6. City infrastructure stock: Continuous, GF and authors’ calculations
7. State infrastructure stock: continuous, GF and authors’ calculations
A: unproduced amenities, vary by region ( j).
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1980-2000 Avg.)) and authors’ calculations.
1. Coastal status: dichotomous, 0-1, authors’ calculations
2. Mean annual rainfall: continuous
3. Mean annual heating degree days: continuous
4. Mean cooling degree days: continuous
E Estimation
We use a two-level hierachical linear model to determine whether city infrastructure can account
for any of the variance in land prices and wages across cities and over time. At the first level we
estimate rent and wage the city fixed effects after controlling for housing quality and human capital
variables. This enables us to compare homogeneous units of observations over time and space.
E.1 Stage 1: Housing-Cost, Wage, and Population Differentials
The first-stage regression equations are:
lnHVi,j,t = α1HQi,j,t + α2,j,tCjTt + i,j,t (A.6)
lnWi,j,t = β1HCi,j,t + β2,j,tCjTt + µi,j,t (A.7)
lnPopj,t = ζ0 + ζ2,j,tCjTt + θj,t (A.8)
where i indexes individual observations, j indexes cities, t indexes years, HV is self-reported
house value, HQ are house quality controls, W is annual wage, HC are human capital controls,
42We thank Nathan Seegert for providing us with this data, which he compiled from The Book of the States and
other sources, as described in Seegert (2012).
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C and T are city and time dummies, and  and µ are standard residual terms. We are interested in
the coefficients α2,j,t and β2,j,t, which we take as composition-adjusted housing prices and wages.
ζ2,j,t indicates population differentials.
Consistent estimation of these coefficients requires that housing quality and worker quality do
not vary systematically across cities. All regressions are estimated by OLS and weighted using
AHS, CPS, and Census of sample size weights43.
E.2 Level 2: Estimating the Effect of Infrastructure
The second stage of the estimation strategy involves examining whether the variance in composition-
adjusted prices can be accounted for by a vector of climate characteristics (Aj), local and state
marginal income tax rates, violent crime rate, and student-teacher ratio (LTSj,t, STSj,t), version
k ∈ {1, . . . , 5} of local infrastructure stock (LGkj,t), and the state infrastructure stock (SGj,t) 44.
The regression equations are
αˆ2,d,j,t = γ1Aj + γ2LTSj,t + γ3STSj,t + γ4LG
k
j,t + γ5SGj,t + γ6Lj,2000 + νj,t (A.9)
βˆ2,d,j,t = δ1Aj + δ2LTSj,t + δ3STSj,t + δ4LG
k
j,t + δ5SGj,t + δ6Lj,2000 + ηj,t (A.10)
ζˆ2,j,t = φ1Aj + φ2LTSj,t + φ3STSj,t + φ4LG
k
j,t + φ5SGj,t + φ6Lj,2000 + ξj,t (A.11)
where αˆ2,d,j,t and βˆ2,d,j,t are the estimated housing quality adjusted house values and human capital
adjusted wages for sample d, city j, time t respectively; and ζˆ2,j,t are the population differentials.
We estimate these regressions using pooled OLS and with city and year fixed effects. Since
we use the prices from three different data sets, we include data set indicator variables in OLS
estimates and use year by data set indicators instead of year indicators in city and year fixed effect
regressions.
We estimate wage and rent elasticity of local infrastructure from A.9 and A.10 and estimate
average willingness to pay for infrastructure by households and firms using the formulas from the
theoretical model.
F Supplementary Results and Robustness
In this section we present further results focused on the relationship between infrastructure and
commuting time, and intra-MSA and inter-MSA spillover effects. At the end, we check the sensi-
tivity of our results to exclusion of different cities.
1. Transportation Costs and Commuting Time. Higher investment in city infrastructure
can reduce the transportation costs, and facilitates commuting. In this section, we investigate the 
magnitude of such a relationship. As shown in Table 10 below, this is particularly relevant for 
our sample because highways and transportation utilities compose 19.5% of total capital outlays 
in our cities. Since we readily have such composition for years after 1950, we can’t construct
43In Particular, we use the square root of average annual sample size which are 1.00, 1.29, 11.13, and 13.74 for
National and Metro samples of AHS, Census of Population, and CPS, respectively.
44See Table 8 for a complete list of the variables used in each of these categories.
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highway and transportation infrastructure stock measures. However, we can test whether the stock
of infrastructure is facilitating the commuting between the employment and residential locations.
We estimate commuting time differentials using the same Census of Population and AHS sam-
ples used for wages, applying the methodology of Albouy and Lue (2015). We regress the square
root of commuting time on the same controls used for the wage equation. The differential is
then constructed using CˆT j = 2µCTj /
¯√CT where ¯√CT is the average of square-root commuting
time45.
In the second stage, we then regress the commuting time differentials on stocks of infrastructure 
and the same other control variables used for wage, rent, and population regressions. Table 11 
shows the regression coefficients for different specifications for central cities and suburbs.
2. The Effect of Central City Infrastructure on Suburbs Not only higher levels of infrastruc-
ture in central cities benefits the residence of them, but also the residence of nearby suburbs may
benefit from it. Since the available investment data does not fully cover the suburbs of metropolitan
areas, we cannot calculate the infrastructure stocks for the suburbs and how those stocks react to
central city investments. However, we test the presence of intra-MSA spillover effects by investi-
gating whether higher central city infrastructure has spillover effects on the suburbs. We can do so
by estimating the relationship between central city infrastructure and the welfare and productivity
of the suburbs.
In our regressions, the infrastructure measures of the suburbs are the missing variable. Con-
sequently, we are overestimating the direct effect of central city infrastructure on the suburbs if
suburban infrastructure stocks are positively co-moving with the central city stocks. On the other
hand, if the central city infrastructure crowds out suburban investments, we are underestimating the
direct effects. This is straightforward from the omitted variable bias formula in linear regression.
Table 12 shows positive and statistically significant effects of central city infrastructure on 
suburban wage and housing price differentials.
3. Sensitivity of the Results to large cities In this section we show how sensitive the main
results are to removing certain cities in our sample. We do this by estimating the main second stage 
results while excluding each city from the sample. Repeating this exercise 84 times, we present 
the average coefficients and p-values in Table 13 below.
The log-log specification estimates are fairly robust to exclusion of different cities from our
sample. This is consistent with precision of these estimates presented earlier. Reassuringly, if we
treat the range of these estimates as alternative confidence bands, our conclusions will be similar
to those drawn from the confidence bands of the full sample estimates.
45We use square root since Albouy and Lue (2015) found that it fits the data better, and as it accommodates reports
of zero commuting time
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Table 9: Summary Statistics
(1) (2)
Mean Std. Dev.
Census Housing cost differential -0.14 0.51
Census HCD: Owners -0.18 0.51
Census Wage Differential -0.07 0.11
National AHS Housing cost differential -0.61 0.69
National AHS HCD: Owners -0.18 0.44
National AHS Wage Differential -0.08 0.20
Metro AHS Housing cost differential -0.58 0.63
Metro AHS HCD: Owners 0.17 0.43
Metro AHS Wage Differential -0.14 0.49
All AHS Housing cost differential -0.58 0.68
All AHS HCD: Owners -0.13 0.44
All AHS Wage Differential -0.08 0.21
CPS Wage Differential -0.02 0.11
Central City Population (Log of thousands) 12.86 0.77
Central City Infrastructure Stock ($Billions) 7.44 17.76
Avg. Annual Precipitation 37.78 14.50
Avg. Cooling Degree Days in 65 1,389 946
Avg. Heating Degree Days in 65 4,125 2,059
City on Sea 0.34 0.47
City on Lake 0.10 0.30
Student/Teacher Ratio 18.04 4.42
Top Inc. Tax Rate 5.28 3.87
Bottom Inc. Tax Rate 1.75 1.69
State and Local Sales Tax Rate 4.96 1.29
State Infrastructure Stock ($Billions) 65 47.86
# Violent Crimes per 100K 1,121 636
Source: Difference sources listed in Table (8), 1980-2011. There are 85 distinct cities in our sample.
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Table 10: Component shares of investment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Total Educ-Cap Outlay (% of total) 3.867 11.371 0 98.946 3,471
Gen Pub Bldg-Cap Out (% of total) 1.909 4.869 0 72.146 3,471
Total Hospital-Cap Out (% of total) 0.650 3.107 0 61.747 3,471
Total Highways-Cap Out (% of total) 18.576 14.81 0 90.658 3,471
Hous & Com-Cap Outlay (% of total) 7.182 12.698 0 100 3,471
Parks & Rec-Cap Outlay (% of total) 5.896 8.703 0 67.703 3,471
Sanitation-Cap Out (% of total) 7.197 9.864 0 91.601 3,471
Sewerage-Cap Outlay (% of total) 8.886 10.644 0 81.057 3,471
General NEC-Cap Out (% of total) 24.866 19.484 0 100 3,471
Liquor Stores-Cap Out (% of total) 0.002 0.143 0 8.401 3,471
Total Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 20.969 20.986 0 99.529 3,471
Water Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 14.566 15.391 0 92.705 3,471
Elec Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 5.037 14.649 0 86.354 3,471
Gas Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 0.451 2.366 0 47.786 3,471
Transit Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 0.914 3.379 0 46.1 3,471
Calculated using the data from City Government Finances 1950-2006 for our sample of cities.
Table 11: The relationship between Infrastructure Stocks and Commuting time
Model City and Year &Fixed Effects?
Commuting Time,
Central Cities
Commuting Time,
Suburbs
Log N 0.182*** 0.138***
(0.019) (0.017)
Log C,Y 0.083** 0.044
(0.034) (0.027)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 12: Central City and Suburban Elasticities
Housing Price
Elasticity Wage Elasticity Population Elasticity
Model
City and
Year Fixed
Effects?
Central
City Suburb
Central
City Suburb
Central
City Suburb
Log N 0.123*** 0.137*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.475***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.063)
Log C, Y 0.105* -0.068 0.076*** 0.048** 0.386*** 0.422***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.023) (0.020) (0.071) (0.083)
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. In column 2, “N” indicates no fixed effects and “C,Y”, city and year fixed effects.
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Table 13: City Exclusion Robustness Log Specification
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Housing cost
Coefficient 0.106 0.007 0.085 0.124
P-Value 0.086 0.021 0.044 0.159
Wage
Coefficient 0.077 0.003 0.069 0.086
P-Value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003
Place Population (Log)
Coefficient 0.386 0.009 0.347 0.407
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
51
